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the service characterization as protection to institutional suppliers of
blood. The Cunningbam court rejects the underlying policy determina-
tion as unsound in view of the rejection of the doctrine of charitable
immunity in Illinois.' 4 The court concludes that the blood transaction
involves a sale since there is no meaningful distinction between blood,
food and other products. 15
The court extends the doctrine of strict liability in tort into the
medical supply field by holding that the transfusion of blood constitutes
a sale. The court felt that to perpetuate the decision in Perlmutter would
be counter to Illinois policies of consumer protection and rejection of
charitable immunity.' This decision does not intimate that the hospital
is to be made an insurer of the purity of its medical supplies. The court
merely intends that the hospital shall be held to the same standards of
accountability as apply to other suppliers of goods.'7
CHARLES W. BOOHAR
Constitutional Law-DuE PROCESS-JuRISDICTION OVER ALIEN COR-
PORATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v.
Hollingswortb, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
Defendant Duple Motor Bodies, a British corporation, designed and
manufactured coach bodies for Vauxhall Motors, which assembled the
busses and shipped them to Hawaii where they were sold to Maui Island
Inc, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966) (action against blood bank). But see White
v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968), cert. denied, 211
So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968) (action against hospital).
14. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N..2d 253
(1965).
15. - Ill. App. 2d at -, 251 NE.2d at 736.
16. Id.
17. The court's characterization of the blood transfusion as a sale does not eliminate
all of the problems of recovery for a plaintiff. This is because the Supreme Court of
Illinois has adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort as provided in RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs S 402A (1965). See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965). A seller of products which are unavoidably unsafe is not to be
held strictly liable "merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reason-
able risk." REsrATEMENT (SEcolND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment k at 353 (1965). See
Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospitals' Liability for Hepatitis Contaminated Blood on
Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48 Cm. B. REcoRD 204 (1967); Medical Judgment
v. Legal Doctrine In the Matter of Hepatitis Contaminated Blood, 49 Cm. B. REcoRD
22 (1967). See generally Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 640 (1958).
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Tours.1 One of the busses overturned, injuring plaintiff, who initiated
this products liability action. From an order of the District Court of
Hawaii denying a motion to quash return of service of process, de-
fendant appealed, claiming that due process should prevent defendant
from being compelled to defend in Hawaii.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order,2
holding that the presence of the defendant's coach bodies in Hawaii,
effected through defendant's sale of the bodies to Vauxhall with knowl-
edge that the product was bound for Hawaii, constituted sufficient
contact with the forum state to satisfy the requirements of due process.
The court found compliance with both the Hawaii long arm statute3
and the United States Constitution.4
In 1945, in the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington,3 the Supreme Court essentially overruled the long-standing
"physical power" concept of jurisdiction espoused in Pennoyer v. Neff.'
International Shoe held that in order for a state to acquire jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, due process required merely that de-
fendant be served with proper notice, and that defendant have certain
minimum contacts with the forum state.7 In a series of subsequent de-
1. 417 F. 2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 236.
3. HAiVAf'REv. STAT. § 634-71 (1968):
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits his person, and, if an individual, his personal representative,
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of the acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State ....
The Hawaii statute was adopted from the Illinois long arm statute, ILL. AN. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968), which was held to be constitutionally valid by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Nelson v. Miller, 11111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
4. U. S. CONsr. amend. XIV.
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court held that the physical presence of the defendant
in the forum state was a jurisdictional requisite.
7. 326 U.S. at 316. A concise summary of the evolution of long arm jurisdiction is
provided by Chief Justice Stone:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personarn is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer 'v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
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cisions the Court attempted to define "minimum contacts," 8 Culinating
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,9 where a single contact having
a substantial connection with the forum state was held to be sufficient
contact to confer jurisdiction and meet the requirements of due process.' °
This ruling was limited by Hanson v. Denckla," which established that
a nonresident defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting transactions within the forum state in order to
be amenable to its jurisdiction."2
The extension of the states' jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
has exerted a momentous influence in the field of products liability.1
Doubtlessly, the most significant decision to spring from the union of
products liability and long arm jurisdiction was Gray v. American Ra-
diator & Standard Sanitary Corp."4 The use of the defendant's product
within the state was sufficient contact with the state to render the de-
fendant amenable to suit therein.' 5 In short, liability follows the prod-
uct. This sweeping decision led to a split of opinion among the various
jurisdictions. Some courts, grounding their reasoning on the "stream
of commerce" approach, followed the lead of the Illinois court in Gray.'6
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personain, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316, quoting from Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
8. For a comprehensive discussion of minimum contacts theory and its difficulties,
see Johnson, How Minimum is 'Minimum Contact'? An Examination of 'Long Arm'
Jursidiction, 9 S. Tnx L.J. 184 (1967).
9. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
10. Id. at 223.
11. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
12. ld. at 253.
13. The effect of jurisdictional expansion on products liability is reviewed extensively
in Levin, The 'Long Arm' Statute and Products Liability, 4 WiT-1 AmErTE L.J. 331 (1967).
14. 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
15. [I]t is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects
in his [manufacturer's] product, to say that the use of such products in the
ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify
a requirement that he defend here.
176 N.E.2d at 766.
16. E.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Aftanese v.
Economy Bailor Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d
423 (Alas. 1965); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732
(1966); Tice v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 259 Iowa 27, 141 N.W.2d 616 (1966);
Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966);
Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
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Others, in line with Hanson, required that the defendant commit some
definite act with respect to the state in order to come under its jurisdic-
tion.17
In Duple, the court is clearly applying the stream of commerce theory
of jurisdiction, but by extending this rule to an alien defendant it has
materially enlarged the scope of long arm jurisdiction in products lia-
bility cases. There is an emerging trend implicit in the parallel evolution
of products liability and extended jurisdiction toward affording greater
protection to the consumer. To this end, previously insurmountable
barriers of jurisdiction and privity have been demolished.18 This deci-
sion, the logical conclusion of the stream of commerce doctrine of
products liability jurisdiction, carries with it the import that alien cor-
porations will now be required to stand behind their products after
entry into this country.19
RICHARD B. BLACKWELL
17. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc, 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963); Hodge v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966).
See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964).
The plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, brought an action against defendant French cor-
poration for injuries received in an automobile accident allegedly caused by defective
brakes. The court held that the existence of three dealers in the state for defendant's
product, one of which showed annual gross profits in excess of $100,000, together with
the distribution of warranties to which defendant was a party, did not constitute
sufficient contacts for the state to acquire jurisdiction.
18. For an informative survey of the development of the doctrine of products liability,
see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L.
REv. 791 (1966).
19. As pointed out in the court's opinion, a judgment rendered against defendant may
be difficult to enforce. However, difficulty of enforcement of a judgment is not to be
confused with the judgment's validity. Any judgment rendered against defendant
would be binding upon it, and any property it owned or acquired within the United
States or any territory thereof would be subject to levy of execution.
This is not the first decision to hold an alien corporation amenable to suit in a do-
mestic court. Cf. Stewart v. Bus & Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio 1968), where
a Belgian corporation was held to be amenable to suit in Ohio because it derived
substantial revenue from goods used in that state. Id. at 584. However, in Stewart,
defendant directly transacted business with an Ohio firm, Lakeshore Coach Company.
Id. at 581. The departure of the Duple court lies in the finding that defendant was
within the jurisdiction of Hawaii even though it conducted no business with any
Hawaiian concern.
